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1Unveiling Hidden Districts: Assessing the Adoption Patterns of Business
Improvement Districts in California
A wealth of anecdotal evidence suggests that, in the wake of tax revolts, cities have
responded with a proliferation of special assessment districts which directly link taxes and
their local public good beneﬁciaries. Despite this, there is no systematic evidence on the
adoption patterns of these districts, likely because they are not surveyed by the U.S. Census
of Governments. This paper begins to ﬁll this gap by reporting the results of a survey
on the adoption patterns of one class of special assessment districts, Business Improvement
Districts (BIDs), in the state of California. A BID is formed when a majority of merchants or
property owners in a commercial neighborhood vote in favor of a package of local taxes and
expenditures; once passed, assessments are legally binding on all members of the commercial
neighborhood. I ﬁnd that roughly half of all larger cities in California have at least one BID;
among the universe of cities in four Southern California counties, that ﬁgure falls to about
one-ﬁfth. On the demand side, theory and evidence suggest that BIDs should be adopted in
heterogeneous cities to supplement local public goods to neighborhood taste. On the supply
side, theory argues that BIDs solve the collective action problem arising in the provision of
public goods when the number of group members is large. In particular, older commercial
neighborhoods have many landowners who may have trouble coordinating the provision
of local public goods, in contrast to the single mall developer who can write contracts to
internalize externalities. Combining the survey data with demographic, institutional and
political data, I ﬁnd strong support for the supply-side story, and some evidence that the
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2Anecdotal evidence (Chapman, 1998; Fay, 1989; Porter, 1989) suggests that tax and
expenditure limits adopted by states in the 1970s have led to a proliferation of special as-
sessment districts. Generally, a special assessment district is a sub-municipal entity that
levies taxes on a geographically small district and uses the revenues to fund local improve-
ments in that district. By levying taxes only on districts constructed to directly beneﬁt
from those levies, special assessment districts avoid tax revolt strictures. Despite the grow-
ing importance of these districts, basic patterns of adoption are unknown. Indeed, because
these districts are not surveyed by the Census of Governments, their adoption patterns are a
mystery to researchers (see Briﬀault (1999) for the state of knowledge on special assessment
districts).1 More broadly, special assessment districts are part of a long research interest in
the determinants and consequences of provision of local public goods (Tiebout, 1956; Epple
and Romano, 1996; Helsley and Strange, 1999).2
This paper begins to ﬁll the gap in knowledge about sub-municipal public goods provision
by presenting the results of a survey of California cities describing the adoption patterns of
one particular form of special assessment district: the Business Improvement District (BID).
In California, a BID is formed when a group of merchants or property owners vote in favor of
a package of taxation and local public services. Once a majority of assessment-weighted votes
are cast in favor, state law makes the contributions of all neighborhood members mandatory.
BIDs provide local public goods such as cleaning, marketing and safety, and are of interest
because quantitative analysis shows they have been able to reduce crime in Los Angeles and
Philadelphia (Brooks, 2006b; Calanog, 2004; Hoyt, 2005). In addition, anecdotal evidence
credits them with a myriad of neighborhood improvements (Houston, Jr., 2003).
Previous work has surveyed existing BIDs (Mitchell, 2001) to determine services and
1This is in contrast to special districts, which generally provide services such as water or sewage across
many municipalities, and which are surveyed by the Census of Governments.
2This project is of particular interest because data on other special assessment districts are even more
diﬃcult to collect than data on BIDs. Many special assessment districts are neither surveyed by another
other level of government or consistently in the same department across cities.
3goals, relying on the list of BIDs compiled by the International Downtown Association.
While this list likely includes most of the largest BIDs, it is unreliable as a comprehensive
survey of BID adoption. To completely capture BID adoption patterns, this paper oﬀers the
ﬁrst comprehensive survey of adoption patterns by city, the jurisdiction that authorizes BIDs
in California. I ﬁnd that roughly half of California cities with a population of at least 25,000
in 1980 have BIDs. Among the sample of all cities in the four largest Southern California
counties, almost one-ﬁfth have at least one BID.
What motivates BID adoption at the city level? I propose and test supply and demand
side hypotheses. On the demand side, recent work has suggested that more heterogeneous
cities should be more likely to either supplement or opt out of government provision (Alesina
et al., 1999; Chaudhary, 2005; Poterba, 1997; Temple, 1996). The intuition behind this
prediction is that heterogeneous residents may have diﬃculty agreeing upon a public good
of mutual interest.
In contrast, the supply side hypothesis is motivated by the work of Olson (1971), who
argues that even groups with common goals face a collective action problem in the provision
of public goods. In commercial clusters, local public goods of mutual interest include secu-
rity, cleanliness and parking. One way to overcome collective action problems in providing
these local public goods is an institution that coerces membership. In newer commercial
development, such as malls, coercive force is applied by the developer who prices externali-
ties into rental contracts (Gould et al., 2002). In contrast, urban planners have long noted
that older commercial areas have no counterpart for the mall developer. Thus, the theory of
collective action argues that the BID institution should solve the problem of an inadequate
level of public goods only in non-mall commercial areas, which are predominantly in older
commercial neighborhoods and cities.
By combining the data from the survey of BIDs with demographic, government and
economic data, I test whether these two hypotheses – and the two in conjunction – can
4explain BID adoption. I ﬁnd that the only persistently signiﬁcant explanation for BID
adoption lies on the supply side: BIDs are consistently adopted by older cities and adoption
increases non-linearly in city age. More limited evidence suggests that the interaction of
heterogeneity and community age also explains BID adoption, and is consistent with both
the supply and demand sides of the theory.
1 Theoretical Framework
Consider that BID adoption is a function of both a demand for BID-like services – het-
erogeneity – and a supply of BID-resolvable diﬃculties – those problems created by older
neighborhoods. On the demand side, I modify the Alesina et al. (1999) model to explain
why the heterogeneity of residents should also apply to ﬁrms – which BIDs are – and not
just residents. The Alesina et al model posits a jurisdiction without mobility, where individ-
uals have preferences over the amount and type of a public good. The jurisdiction chooses
its level of public goods ﬁrst by voting on the size of the public good and then by voting
on the type. In equilibrium, as tastes for the public good become more heterogeneous, the
jurisdiction provides less of the public goods.
To modify the model, I associate citizens in Alesina’s world not just with a city, but
also with a neighborhood. In addition, I add two not terribly restrictive assumptions. First,
assume that the ﬁrms of interest are retail businesses. This conforms very closely with the
actual composition of BIDs. Second, assume that ﬁrms serve local residents and local public
goods such as crime prevention, parking and cleanliness are an important part of the retail
shopping experience. Speciﬁcally, assume that ﬁrms’ proﬁts are decreasing in the diﬀerence
between the municipally provided level of the public good and the locally desired level of the
public good.3 Formally, this is
PJ
j min(0,g∗ − g∗
j), where g∗ is the public good provided by
3In some cities, where small business owners have historically lived over their shops, there could be some
confusion between ﬁrm and resident. As an empirical matter, this practice is much less frequent in California
5the city, and g∗
j is the level of the public good desired by person j of neighborhood J.
Retailers’ proﬁt increases as the diﬀerence between the municipally chosen level of public
good, g∗, and each neighborhood resident’s desired level of public good, g∗
j shrinks.4 From
the Alesina et al. (1999) model, we know that the amount of the public good provided by
the city, g∗, declines in consumer heterogeneity.5 Because ﬁrms’ proﬁts are increasing in
g∗, ﬁrms are more desirous of supplementing the municipally-provided level of public goods
when a city is heterogeneous. In sum, the Alesina et al. (1999) model suggests that more
heterogeneous cities are more likely to have supplemental provision of local public goods.
On the supply side, suppose that BIDs resolve a collective action problem in the provision
of local public goods in a neighborhood of ﬁrms. For example, each ﬁrm in a neighborhood
would like to provide parking for its customers. Suppose that no ﬁrm ﬁnds it proﬁtable
to provide parking alone, and that parking is not proﬁtably oﬀered by the private market.
Because parking for tenants is a local public good for ﬁrms, each ﬁrm is reluctant to make
a commitment to parking without a binding commitment from all other ﬁrms. Without a
binding commitment, a suboptimal level of parking – perhaps even no parking at all – is
provided.
Note that this collective action problem arises only when the number of ﬁrms is large and
an actor to internalize externalities is lacking. In the urban context, these two elements are
closely correlated with the era of development. In older commercial neighborhoods, ﬁrms
lease from individual property owners. In contrast, in newer commercial neighborhoods
ﬁrms are typically agglomerated into shopping malls, strip malls or big box centers. In these
newer developments, a single developer writes a contract with his many tenants to provide
the public goods at issue, in eﬀect internalizing the externalities. Gould et al. (2002) show
than in the eastern United States, so this model accords well with the data.
4The minimum operator restricts “too much” of the public good from being harmful.
5Formally, Alesina et al. (1999) call this heterogeneity the “median distance from the type most preferred
by the median voter.”
6that developers write lease contracts for malls to eﬃciently allocate space and internalize
externalities – such as those generated by anchor stores. In big box developments, where each
store provides a wide variety of goods, the number of ﬁrms is smaller than in older commercial
neighborhoods. Therefore, the BID institution is of use only in older commercial areas; if
newer commercial developments are providing sub-optimal levels of public goods, it is not
because they have failed to overcome the collective action problem.
In sum, theory suggests that BID adoption should occur in highly heterogeneous cities
and in cities with older commercial stock. In particular, BID adoption should be highest in
cities where these two factors work in tandem, and I will explore this interaction empirically.
2 Business Improvement Districts
Because BID legislation varies by state, this study focuses on one large state – California – in
order to look at adoption patterns within an otherwise constant institutional environment.
California has had some variant of a BID law on the books since the 1950s, when the
state allowed for the taxation of merchants by district to provide parking lots. Over the
years, the state has broadened the mandate of these BIDs. In 1989 the state expanded
the mandate of permitted services from mostly parking to include marketing and various
neighborhood improvements. A major law change in 1995 expanded potential assessees from
solely merchants to include commercial property owners and expanded allowable services to
security and other larger structural improvements. This new law escapes the stringencies
of California’s Proposition 13 by calling this tax an assessment, and BID professionals are
always careful to refer to the tax as an assessment. Taxation of residents or residential
properties is explicitly forbidden in all versions of the law.
In order to establish a BID, commercial property or business owners in a neighborhood
7decide upon a boundary, assessment schedule and budget for the district.6 They then attempt
to convince their neighbors that they, too, should support the BID. The city administers
formal voting, and votes are weighted by assessment. Commercial properties or businesses
in BIDs may be assessed in any way commensurate with the beneﬁts that property receives.
Usually the assessment of properties is some combination of building square footage, lot
square footage, and front footage; for businesses it is frequently a percentage of the city’s
business license tax. If a majority of assessment-weighted votes are cast in favor of the BID
– which is the entire bundle of boundaries, assessments and expenditures for the 1 to 5 year
life of the BID – it is established and taxes are mandatory for all merchant owners within
the district. The BID then functions as a not-for-proﬁt corporation.
BIDs are quite small. For the city of Los Angeles, I have complete information on
each individual BID and oﬀer information on Los Angeles BIDs in 2002 as illustration.
In the city of Los Angeles, BIDs are usually much smaller than a square kilometer and
account for less than two percent of the city’s land area. In 2002, Los Angeles BIDs spent
almost 19 million dollars. A third of that expenditure went to security, and the remaining
funds went to a mix of marketing, cleaning, special projects and administration. Compared
to the hundreds of millions in federal monies spent on the Section 8 housing program or
Community Development Block Grants, these numbers may seem small. However, when
compared to city spending, BID expenditures are large local investments. The Hollywood
Entertainment District BID covers roughly three-quarters of a square kilometer and its $1.4
million per square kilometer of security spending slightly exceeds LAPD expenditures of $1.3
million per square kilometer in the same area (Los Angeles Police Department, Information
Technology Division, 2003; City of Los Angeles, 2003). The Chinatown BID, at 0.3 kilometers
square, in addition to spending on security patrols, spends $280,000 annually on cleaning and
6Formally, commercial properties are those zoned commercial by the city. Business are usually found via
ﬁrms that pay a city’s business license tax.
8maintenance. In comparison, the city of Los Angeles spends $55,000 per square kilometer
(City of Los Angeles, 2003).7 Thus, though BID expenditures may be small in total, they
are locally substantial, sometimes outpacing the city’s own expenditures.
The very existence of a BID-like entity is strong evidence that neighborhoods have diﬃ-
culty providing public goods without a coercive mechanism, as theorized by Olson (1971).8
Of the 253 cities sampled for this paper, slightly less than one-third had at least one BID in
2000.
3 Data and Estimation
The primary data for this research comes from a survey I conducted of 253 cities in California.
This sample includes all 114 cities with a population of over 25,000 people in 1980 and the
universe of cities in San Diego, Riverside, Orange and Los Angeles counties, which account
for an additional 123 cities.9 By having data on both large cities and a geographically
homogeneous group of small cities, the research can yield conclusions about two types of
cities. For each city, I asked how many BIDs of each type (merchant or property) the city
had, and if there were any BIDs, what year the earliest BID was adopted. I ﬁrst searched for
each city’s BIDs online. If that search did not produce any evidence of a BID, I searched the
city’s own webpage to ﬁnd information about BIDs. Always as a supplement, and if neither
of these methods revealed any information, as it frequently did not, I called or emailed the
city to ask an economic development oﬃcial about BIDs in that city,10 and took that oﬃcial’s
7BID information for the city of Los Angeles comes from city council ﬁles.
8Prior to the widespread adoption of BIDs, cities used the coercive mechanism of eminent domain to
resolve the collective action problem by grouping parcels and re-selling larger lots to developers. Amid
charges of racism and developer cronyism, this solution to the collective action problem has fallen from
favor.
9I surveyed the county of Los Angeles in 2004; the remaining cities were surveyed in late 2005 and early
2006.
10In general, I enquired whether a city had any BIDs, so the data are most complete for BIDs as of this
decade. In very few instances did a city say that it had a BID in the past and did not have one now. I also
did not count as BIDs the very few cases where city oﬃcials described a mechanism for hotel marketing that
9word as the ﬁnal say.11
Through repeated calling, this survey has a 97 percent response rate, so it reliably covers
the universe of cities surveyed.12 The third row of Table 2 shows mean BID adoption by
group: among Southern California cities, roughly one-ﬁfth have any BIDs; for larger cities the
share is roughly half. In both groups, as shown in the fourth row of Table 2, BID-adopting
cities are more populous than the non-adopting cities, though the bias is less strong in the
sample of larger cities.
To give a sense of BID prevalence, Table 1 lists the twenty largest cities in California,
and shows that only seven do not have any BIDs. All of the ﬁve largest cities – Los Angeles,
San Diego, San Jose, San Francisco and Long Beach – have BIDs, as do eight of the ten
largest. The oldest BID among this sample started in 1966 in Modesto.
In order to evaluate whether supply- or demand-side factors lead to BID adoption, I
combine the survey data with data from a variety of sources. Because the survey data
include year of BID adoption, I am able to construct a panel of observations at the city-year
level. From the 1980, 1990 and 2000 decennial censuses, I add data on population, income,
race, and household and housing characteristics. From the 1977, 1987, and 1997 economic
censuses I use data on the value of retail sales; from the 1982, 1987, and 1997 government
censuses I use city expenditure per capita.13 Data on crime by city comes from the FBI’s
Uniform Crime Reports from 1980, 1990 and 2000; information on municipal institutions,
including year of incorporation, comes from the 1987 Census of Governments.
To measure the demand side variable of interest, heterogeneity, I calculate the index of
functions under the BID statute.
11Note that because BIDs are economic-development oriented, they are relatively easy to ﬁnd within the
city bureaucracy. Other special districts, such as those that collect for local parks or lighting can be nearly
impossible to ﬁnd in any systematic fashion. For example, in the city of San Diego, the Parks Department
is in charge of administrating special assessment districts.
12This sample does not include the eight cities (from the four Southern California counties, San Jac-
into; from the larger cities sample, Martinez, Ontario, Upland, Milpitas, Santa Clara, Sunnyvale and West
Sacramento) I was forced to drop that did not respond to repeated enquires.
13See the appendix for a complete list of control variables.
10fragmentation or Herﬁndahl index, H for correlates of demand for public goods: income,
education and race.14 This index is calculated as H =
Pn
i=1 s2
i, where n is the number of
groups (e.g., income categories) and si is the share of each group in the population. For
example, if a city is 1/3 low income, 1/3 medium income and 1/3 high income, the city has
H = 1/3; if all citizens are high income, H = 1. Thus, the index goes from zero to one, where
a heterogeneous city with population split equally between a large number of groups has an
index approaching zero, and a homogeneous city with all members in one group has an index
of one.15 Prior research (Alesina et al., 2004; Vigdor, 2004) has found racial heterogeneity
to be more predictive of lowered levels of public goods than heterogeneity of income or
education. However, because the public goods at issue here are those which are important
to ﬁrms, and possibly less redistributional in nature, it is plausible that racial heterogeneity
should be less salient in this instance than heterogeneity of income or education.
To measure the supply side of BID adoption, I use two variables which capture the
quantity of older commercial infrastructure, and denote their vector as agei,t. First, the
Census measures the era of residential construction by neighborhood, and I use this to
construct the share of residential buildings constructed after 1940 by city. Unfortunately,
this measure does not contain much variance. For the sample of larger cities, the 10th to
90th percentile range is 0.78 to 0.99, and for the Southern California sample, it is 0.81 to
0.995 with a mean of 0.95. In additional, while the age of commercial structures should be
correlated with the age of residential structures, the relationship may be weak.
The ideal measure of a city’s age of commercial infrastructure would be the era when the
size of parcels and the size and shape of the street grid were formed. Following the work of
Jacobs (1961), these variables determine how ﬁrms and properties relate economically to one
another, and how they jointly demand local public goods. Because the census data capture
14This index is identical to the Herﬁndahl index for measuring concentration within an industry.
15In related research, I focus exclusively on comparing spatial and non-spatial measures of heterogeneity
to see which best explains BID adoption (Brooks, 2006a).
11only the age of currently existing construction, they obscure the initial era of development.
However, cities choose to incorporate, in part to have control over exactly these elements of
land use regulation, and the year of incorporation is observable.
Thus, the second and preferred measure of the age of commercial infrastructure, likely
more closely correlated with the collective action costs commercial neighborhoods face, is
a city’s year of incorporation. Indeed, even while buildings are replaced, infrastructure, in
the form of the street grid and property parcels, is much more costly to replace. To test
whether a city’s year of incorporation is correlated in any meaningful way to the initial era
of development, I use information from the Los Angeles County Assessor’s Oﬃce on the
age of all structures in the 87 cities in Los Angeles county. For each city, I know the age
of the primary building on each individual property. If the year of incorporation is a good
measure of the era of initial commercial development, the year of incorporation should be
correlated with lower percentiles in the distribution of building age. This is indeed the case:
among the 87 cities in Los Angeles county, the correlation between the year of incorporation
and ﬁfth percentile of the building age distribution is 0.59; the correlation with the tenth
percentile is 0.55. Among the thirty cities in Los Angeles County over 50,000 people in 1980,
the correlations are even stronger – 0.68 and 0.70, respectively. Thus, particularly for larger
cities, year of incorporation tracks closely the city’s initial era of development.
Combining these measures, I determine the impact of supply and demand factors on BID
adoption at the city level by estimating
Pr(BIDi,t = 1|heti,t,agei,controlsi,t,yeart)
= Φ(α0 + α1heti,t + α2agei + α3controlsi,t + α4,tyeart) . (1)
Observations are at the city-year level and the binary choice of whether or not a city i has any
BIDs at time t, BIDi,t, is determined by a measure of heterogeneity, heti,t, a vector measure
12of city age, agei, a vector of demographic, institutional and business controls, controlsi,t, and
year dummies, yeart. I use the year dummies to control for area-wide shocks such as the
decline of the aerospace industry, which could aﬀect the regional provision of public goods.
Heterogeneity is decreasing from 0 to 1, so if it is associated with BID adoption, α1 will be
negative. Age is measured by the city’s year of incorporation and the share of residential
buildings constructed after 1940; if older infrastructure is associated with BID adoption, α2
should be less than zero.
Note that the estimation does not include city ﬁxed eﬀects. Across the heterogeneity vari-
ables, the variance between cities is usually roughly double the variance within cities. Also,
conceptually, restricting the model with city-level ﬁxed eﬀects would require all identiﬁcation
of BID adoption to come from changes within a city, whereas the theory concentrates on a
city’s long-term level of heterogeneity.16 Using ﬁxed eﬀects would also preclude including a
city’s year of incorporation, which does not vary over time.
In order to estimate the joint impact of the supply- and demand-side factors, I use two
interactions. An interaction is preferred to summing the two linear eﬀects, because it is
theoretically quite plausible that BIDs arise only when both the supply- and demand-side
factors are present together. In such an event, the individual coeﬃcients would not follow
a linear function, and their sum would be misleading. The ﬁrst interaction is thus between
heterogeneity and the year of incorporation: H ∗ incorpi,t. If heterogeneity and city age
are only explain BID adoption together, then the coeﬃcient on the interaction should be
negative and signiﬁcant, while the main eﬀects may be zero.
The second interaction to estimate the joint impact of heterogeneity and city age is an
interaction of dummy variables, which I use to pinpoint where I expect the impact on BID
adoption to be strongest. For the measure of heterogeneity, I create two dummy variables:
16I do cluster standard errors at the city level in order to correct for the repeated observations of multiple
cities which would otherwise overstate the true degrees of freedom in the regression.
13one if the measure is in the top half, Hhigh, of the distribution and one if the measure is in
the bottom half, Hlow. Similarly, I construct two dummies for the age distribution, incorpnew
and incorpold. Theory suggests that BID adoption should be most prevalent where supply-
and demand-side factors interact, or when a city is old and heterogeneity is high. This pair
is one of the four combinations of dummy interactions: H low and new incorporation year,
H high and new incorporation year, H low and old incorporation year, and H high and
old incorporation year. Thus, if BID adoption is compelled by a supply- and demand-side
interaction, the coeﬃcient on the ﬁnal dummy interaction should be positive and signiﬁcant.
4 Results
Summary statistics in Panel A of Table 2 show that BID cities are, on average, more populous
and have higher per capita city government expenditures than non-BID cities. Among the
Southern California cities, the mean population of cities with BIDs is roughly ﬁve times the
mean population of cities without BIDs. Among the larger cities, cities with BIDs, at a mean
population of 220,000, are roughly twice the size of the non-BID cities. No clear pattern or
diﬀerences emerge in median family income between BID- and non-BID cities.
The remainder of the table compares BID and non-BID cities on the supply- and demand-
side measures. For both samples, Panel B shows that for poverty, family income and edu-
cation, cities with BIDs are signiﬁcantly more heterogeneous than cities without BIDs. For
heterogeneity of household type, age and race, no clear pattern emerges in either sample.
Panel C shows that cities with BIDs are substantially older than cities without BIDs – a
mean incorporation year of 1907 versus 1938 for the Southern California sample, and 1886 vs.
1916 for the larger cities sample – and have slightly less post-1940 residential construction.
Turning to the estimation, Table 3 shows the results of estimating Equation 1 for all larger
cities in California, focusing on the heterogeneity of poverty; a later table will present results
14for all types of heterogeneity. Each column in each panel presents the results from a separate
regression. The ﬁrst set of three regressions in Panel A considers the impact of heterogeneity
(H) of poverty and share of residential construction post-1940 (column 1); H and year of
incorporation (column 2); and the interaction of H and the year of incorporation (column
3). All coeﬃcients are marginal eﬀects at the mean of the regressors from probit estimations
and control for the “basic” set of covariates: population and its square, racial composition,
household composition, income and characteristics of the city’s business environment.
Columns one and two show that heterogeneity marginally signiﬁcantly explains BID
adoption, and that the year of incorporation has more explanatory power for BID adoption
than the share of post-1940 residential stock. Results not presented show that the pattern
of the superior explanatory power of the year of incorporation persists even controlling for
the share of post-1940 residential stock. For this reason, the bulk of the analysis focuses on
the year of incorporation. Column 3 shows that adding the interaction between the measure
of heterogeneity and the year of incorporation likely leads to multi-collinearity problems
because the coeﬃcient on heterogeneity increases twenty times.
Adding additional controls, institutional features in columns four through six, and crime
and clearance rates in columns seven to nine, does not change the qualitative picture. Het-
erogeneity of poverty remains marginally signiﬁcant, but the year of incorporation remains
persistently statistically signiﬁcant in explaining BID adoption. All speciﬁcations with the
interaction are plagued by multicollinearity. The coeﬃcient on year of incorporation sug-
gests that increasing a city’s age by thirty years – the mean diﬀerence between BID and
non-BID cities in the sample of larger cities – increases the likelihood of BID adoption by
roughly two percentage points. The coeﬃcient on heterogeneity is very large; a coeﬃcient on
an index from zero to one, explaining a dichotomous outcome, should be between zero and
one, and this is not the case here. This is likely attributable to the fact that the measure
of heterogeneity does not span the entire zero-one range. The 10th-90th percentile range
15for heterogeneity of poverty in the larger cities sample is 0.32 (Los Angeles) to 0.75 (Bev-
erly Hills is 0.72) and the equivalent range for the southern California sample is only slightly
wider, going from 0.30 to 0.82. Thus, considering only plausible changes in the heterogeneity
variable, the coeﬃcient is more realistic.
The speciﬁcation using the interaction of dummy variables, presented in Panel B of
Table 3 looks more closely at the interaction obscured by problems of multi-collinearity in
the top half of the table. This speciﬁcation includes three dummy variable interactions
for whether heterogeneity is high and the city is old, heterogeneity is low and the city is
old, and heterogeneity is high and the city is new. All coeﬃcients are in reference to the
omitted group – new, homogeneous cities – the theoretically least likely to form a BID.
Theory suggests that the high heterogeneity and old year of incorporation interaction should
best explain BID adoption at the city level, and this prediction is borne out in this table.
Regardless of controls, the high heterogeneity-low incorporation year combination has the
largest coeﬃcient, and the only statistically signiﬁcant one. Being in the high heterogeneity
low incorporation year group raises the likelihood of adopting a BID by more than a third.
Do the dynamics that explain BID adoption for larger cities hold for the sample of all
cities in four Southern California counties? Table 4 presents results for the same estimations
as Table 3 with this diﬀerent sample. As before, Panel A shows that, regardless of controls,
age of incorporation explains BID adoption better than the share of post-1940 era residential
construction. The coeﬃcient on year of incorporation is roughly the same size as the coeﬃ-
cient from the previous table. As before, the speciﬁcation with the interaction creates large
changes in the coeﬃcients of the main eﬀects, and thus I hesitate to draw conclusions from
that speciﬁcation. The bottom panel of Table 4 repeats the dummy variable speciﬁcation
from the previous table. In the most complete speciﬁcation, I fail to ﬁnd any evidence that
the high heterogeneity old incorporation year combination explains BID adoption better
than either of the other combinations.
16To test whether the interaction is signiﬁcant across diﬀerent measures of heterogeneity,
Table 5 presents results for heterogeneity of education, family income, age, household type,
and race.17 The ﬁrst column in each panel of the table repeats the results for heterogeneity of
poverty from the previous tables. In the top panel, which presents results for all larger cities
in California, the pattern of the preferred high heterogeneity-low incorporation year dummy
being the best explanation for BID adoption holds for two of the six speciﬁcations; those using
the heterogeneity of poverty and age. For another two speciﬁcations, the low heterogeneity
low incorporation year combination explains BID adoption equally as well as the preferred
combination. For heterogeneity of education, the low heterogeneity low incorporation year
combination best explains BID adoption. In the speciﬁcation using heterogeneity of race,
none of the coeﬃcients is signiﬁcant. Among Southern California cities, described in the
bottom panel of Table 5, no clear pattern among any of the three groups emerges.
To push the results on age of incorporation, I divide cities into four rough quartiles by year
of incorporation and present results replacing the continuous variable with these dummies. If
age matters, we should expect that the oldest cities should be most likely to adopt BIDs, and
that the propensity to adopt a BID should decline in age. The ﬁrst column of Table 6 shows
that this prediction holds true examining the raw percentages. The remaining columns of
the table present marginal probabilities from a probit model controlling for three measures
of heterogeneity – that of poverty, education and family income – and the full set of controls
from the previous tables.18 The result continues to hold even when a variety of controls are
added: if a city was established before 1890 it has a somewhat larger than 50 percent greater
likelihood of adopting a BID relative to cities established after 1950 (the omitted group).
Cities established between 1890 and 1910 are roughly 40 percent more likely to adopt BIDs
than the newest cities, and cities established between 1910 and 1950 are between 35 and 40
17Results from the continuous speciﬁcation ﬁnd BID adoption declines in city age and is generally increases
statistically insigniﬁcantly in heterogeneity.
18Results using the other heterogeneity variables, not pictured, are very similar.
17percent more likely.
5 Conclusions
The survey evidence presented here, the ﬁrst to systematically document adoption patterns
of special assessment districts by city, shows that BIDs are widespread among larger cities
in California, and prevalent but not extremely frequent among all cities in the four largest
Southern California counties. In broad terms, these results tell us that BID adoption has
become an increasingly frequent mechanism for the provision of local public goods, and
thus that the consequences of BID adoption – the quality of public goods they provide, and
their impact on the distribution of public goods – are worthy of further study. The results
also suggest that the entire class of special assessment districts has an importance not yet
documented in the literature.
Contrasting supply- and demand-side explanations for BID adoption at the city level, I
ﬁnd that heterogeneity is, at best, an infrequent explanation for BID adoption. However,
a city’s year of incorporation is persistently signiﬁcantly associated with BID adoption,
consistent with BIDs resolving a collective action problem endemic to older commercial
neighborhoods. This result speaks clearly to a role for public policy in resolving issues of
urban decline.
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Table 1: BIDs in California’s Twenty Largest Cities 
 
 
City  2000 Population  Any BIDs?  Year of Incorporation 
Los Angeles  3,694,834  Yes  1925 
San Diego  1,223,341  Yes  1850 
San Jose  893,889  Yes  1850 
San Francisco  776,733  Yes  1850 
Long Beach  461,381  Yes  1897 
Fresno 427,224  No 1885 
Sacramento 407,075 Yes  1849 
Oakland 399,477  Yes  1859 
Santa Ana  337,512  Yes  1869 
Anaheim 327,357  No  1857 
Riverside 255,093  Yes  1883 
Bakersfield 247,385  No  1898 
Stockton 242,714  Yes  1850 
Fremont 203,413  No  1956 
Glendale 195,047  No  1906 
Huntington 
Beach 189,940  Yes  1909 
Modesto 189,460  Yes  1884 
San Bernardino  185,388  No  1905 
Chula Vista  173,860  Yes  1911 
Oxnard 170,595  No 1903 
 
 
Notes: This table reports BID adoption patterns in California's 20 largest cities, and shows that the 
overwhelming majority have at least one BID. 
 
Source: Self-collected survey data on BID adoption, population from 2000 Census Summary Tape File 3A, 
and year of incorporation from 1987 Census of Governments. 
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Table 2: Comparing BID and Non-BID Cities 
 
     
All Southern California 
Cities    
All Larger California 
Cities    
    w/o BIDs  with BIDs    w/o BIDs  with BIDs   
A. General Characteristics                   
             
Unique Cities in 2000  132  27    58  56   
City-Year Observations  408  57    220  122   
Share of Total in 2000  0.83  0.17    0.51  0.49   
Share with any property-based BIDs    0.22      0.27   
Population  54,318  292,962 * 102,836  220,698 *
   (164,540) (680,962)  (226,448)  (489,910)  
Median family income, $1,000s  56.4  60.5    46.4  58.0  *
    (42.8)  (33.3)   (26.2)  (28.4)  
Per capita city expenditures 2000  581.13  921.50  * 602.33  913.60  *
   (441.92)  (502.37)   (403.73)  (585.54)  
N for city expenditures (city-year obs.)  158  49    220  122   
             
B. Demand-Side Measures: Herfindahl Index                 
             
Poverty  0.57   0.50   * 0.56  0.52  *
   (0.20)  (0.15)    (0.16)  (0.15)   
Family Income  0.10   0.08   * 0.09  0.08  *
   (0.05)  (0.02)    (0.03)  (0.02)   
Education  0.21   0.17   * 0.21  0.17  *
   (0.08)  (0.05)    (0.07)  (0.05)   
Household Type  0.32   0.33     0.30  0.32  *
   (0.04)  (0.08)    (0.03)  (0.05)   
Age  0.33   0.33     0.32   0.32    
   (0.03)  (0.04)    (0.02)  (0.02)   
Race  0.62   0.54   * 0.57  0.56   
   (0.19)  (0.18)    (0.19)  (0.18)   
N 399  57    220  122   
             
C. Supply-Side Measures: Age of Insfrastructure                
             
Year of Incorporation  1938  1907  * 1916  1886  *
    (29)  (31)   (33)  (24)  
N 378  57    220  122   
Share of Residential Construction post-1940  0.93   0.89   * 0.92   0.87   *
    (0.09)  (0.09)   (0.09)  (0.11)  
N  399  57     220  122    
 
* Significant difference at the 0.05% level. 
 
Notes: This table compares cities with and without Business Improvement Districts (BIDs). Figures reported are 
means, with standard deviations below means. Herfindahl indices are calculated from the categories given by 
the census.  Panels B and C report values for the largest balanced panel. 
 
Source: Self-collected survey data on BID adoption; see appendix for complete source list.   23
Table 3: The Impact of Heterogeneity of Poverty and Age on BID Adoption in Larger Cities 
 
 
        (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7)  (8) (9) 
A. Continuous Variables                          
H    -1.32 -1.00  -23.20  -1.57 -1.19 -23.15  -1.28 -1.09 -21.38 
    (0.637)* (0.62) (18.04)  (0.655)* (0.64) (17.75)  (0.67) (0.67) (17.51) 
share  after  1940  -0.08     0.01     0.07    
    (0.58)     (0.56)     (0.60)    
year of incorporation    -0.006  -0.013    -0.006 -0.013    -0.005 -0.012 
     (0.002)** (0.006)*  (0.002)** (0.006)*  (0.002)** (0.006)*
H  *  incorporation     0.01    0.01     0.01 
       (0.01)    (0.01)     (0.01) 
Observations  342 342 342 342 342 342  342  342 342 
                  
B. Dummy Interaction Specification                      
Inc.  Year  H              
Old High   0.37    0.38     0.36   
     (0.158)*    (0.156)*     (0.159)*   
Old Low   0.26    0.23     0.22   
     (0.15)    (0.15)     (0.15)   
New High   -0.15    -0.16     -0.15   
     (0.16)    (0.15)     (0.15)   
Observations   342    342     342   
                  
Controls                               
basic    x x x x x x  x  x x 
institutional  features       x x x  x  x x 
crime                       x  x  x 
 
* Significant difference at the 0.05% level. ** Significant difference at the 0.01% level. 
 
Notes: H is the Hirfendahl index for poverty.  This table reports BID adoption patterns in larger California cities, and shows that while heterogeneity is weakly 
associated with BID adoption, year of incorporation is strongly negatively associated with BID adoption.  Basic covariates include population, population 
squared, racial shares, household characteristics, income measures, and business environment characteristics; a complete list is available in the appendix. 
 
Source: Self-collected survey data on BID adoption; see appendix for complete source list.   24
Table 4: The Impact of Heterogeneity of Poverty and Age on BID Adoption in Southern California 
 
 
        (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
A. Continuous Variables                          
H   -1.19  -0.48  3.25  -1.81  -0.45 -3.45  -0.73 -0.15 -7.47 
    (0.80)  (0.60) (18.17) (0.793)* (0.56) (18.15) (0.77)  (0.58) (14.95)
share  after  1940 -0.77     -0.30     -0.59    
    (0.90)     (0.90)     (0.75)    
year of incorporation    -0.005  -0.004    -0.005 -0.006    -0.004 -0.006 
     (0.002)* (0.005)   (0.002)* (0.005)  (0.002)* (0.005)
H * incorporation      -0.002      0.002      0.004 
       (0.01)    (0.01)     (0.01) 
Observations  174 174 174 174  174 174  174 174 174 
                 
B. Dummy Interaction Specification                      
Inc.  Year  H            
Old  High   0.13     0.19    0.00   
     (0.18)    (0.18)    (0.12)   
Old  Low   0.08     0.09    0.04   
     (0.17)    (0.16)    (0.12)   
New  High   -0.11     -0.15    -0.14   
     (0.12)    (0.09)     (0.063)*  
Observations   174     174    174   
                 
Controls                               
basic    x x x x  x x  x x x 
institutional  features       x  x x  x x x 
crime                       x  x  x 
 
* Significant difference at the 0.05% level. ** Significant difference at the 0.01% level. 
 
Notes: This table reports BID adoption patterns in the universe of Southern California cities, and shows that while heterogeneity is weakly associated with BID 
adoption, year of incorporation is strongly negatively associated with BID adoption.  See Table 3 and Appendix for description of covariates. 
 
Source: Self-collected survey data on BID adoption; see appendix for complete source list.   25
Table 5: The Interaction of Heterogeneity and Age on BID Adoption 
 
 
      (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
A. Larger Cities           
   Heterogeneity  of 
Incorporation 





Old  High  0.36 0.38 0.34 0.41 0.54 0.16 
    (0.159)* (0.22) (0.153)*  (0.136)**  (0.146)** (0.17) 
Old  Low  0.22 0.53 0.35 0.25 0.55 0.30 
    (0.15) (0.184)**  (0.134)** (0.17) (0.166)** (0.17) 
New  High  -0.15 0.15 0.05 0.04 0.40 -0.13 
    (0.15) (0.22) (0.13) (0.16)  (0.182)*  (0.14) 
Observations    342    342 342 342 342 342 
          
B. Southern California Cities        
   Heterogeneity  of 
Heterogeneity 
Incorporation 





Old High  0.00  n/a  0.32  0.16  0.44  0.98 
    (0.12) perfectly (0.30)  (0.16)  (0.199)*  (0.160)** 
Old  Low  0.04 predicted 0.11  0.06  0.37  1.00 
    (0.12)  (0.13)  (0.15)  (0.20)  (0.001)** 
New High  -0.14   0.11  -0.02  0.43  0.98 
   (0.063)*    (0.22)  (0.08)  (0.24)  (0.177)** 
Observations   174      174  174  174  151 
          
Controls                      
basic + institutions + crime  x  x  x  x  x  x 
 
* Significant difference at the 0.05% level. ** Significant difference at the 0.01% level. 
 
 
Notes: By dividing age of incorporation into two dummies, one for above and one for below the mean, and doing the same for heterogeneity, this table tests whether the predicted 
high heterogeneity low year of incorporation combination best explains BID adoption.  Among the larger cities sample, there is some evidence that this is the case.  See Table 3 
notes and appendix for description of covariates. 
 
Source: Self-collected survey data on BID adoption; see appendix for complete source list.   26




        (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) 
Incorporation Year  
share with 
BIDs                            
  less than 1890  0.52  0.58  0.55  0.54 0.59 0.58 0.55 0.58 0.56 0.54 
   (0.50)  (0.152)** (0.163)** (0.162)** (0.144)** (0.151)** (0.154)** (0.148)** (0.156)** (0.158)**
  between 1890 and 1910  0.25  0.42  0.41 0.40 0.41 0.40 0.39 0.40 0.39 0.38 
   (0.43)  (0.183)* (0.190)* (0.185)* (0.175)* (0.181)* (0.179)* (0.177)* (0.182)* (0.181)* 
  between 1910 and 1950  0.20  0.38  0.37 0.38 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.34 0.34 0.34 
    (0.40) (0.190)*  (0.20)  (0.192)*  (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
Observations    342 342 342 342 342 342 342 342 342 
               
Controls                               
Heterogeneity  of             
  Poverty    x  x  x        
  Education        x  x  x     
  Family  Income           x  x  x 
Basic    x x x x x x x x x 
Institutional  Features     x  x  x  x  x  x 
Crime           x        x        x 
 
 
* Significant difference at the 0.05% level. ** Significant difference at the 0.01% level. 
 
Notes: This table, for the sample of larger cities only, shows that older cities are more likely to adopt BIDs.  
 
Source: Self-collected survey data on BID adoption; see appendix for complete source list. 6 Appendix: Covariates
Racial Shares
• share African American
• share Hispanic
• share Asian
• Source: Census of Population and Housing, 1980, 1990 and 2000, accessed from UCLA
and ICPSR
Household Characteristics
• mean household size
• share of households with children
• share of single mother-headed households
• population share 65 or older
• share with high school education
• share with bachelor’s degree
• Source: Census of Population and Housing, 1980, 1990 and 2000, accessed from UCLA
and ICPSR
Income
• median household income
• mean family income
• Source: Census of Population and Housing, 1980, 1990 and 2000, accessed from UCLA
and ICPSR
Business Characteristics
• retail sales per capita
• total sales per capita
• city government expenditure per capita
• Source: City and County Data Books, 1988, 1994 and 2000, accessed via the University
of Virginia; contain information from the 1982, 1987 and 1997 economic censuses
27Crime
• oﬀenses per capita
• clearance rate
• Source: FBI Uniform Crime Reports, 1980, 1990, 2000, accessed via ICPSR
Institutional Characteristics
• year of incorporation
• whether council has at large members
• whether city operates under homerule
• whether or not city uses mayor-council form of government
• Source: 1987 Census of Governments, accessed from Census
28